Simultaneous Presence of Different Domestic GAAPs and Investors' Limited Attention Bias in U.S. Equity Markets: Implication for Convergence
Abstract: The behavioral finance literature indicates that simultaneously processing fewer information signals, such as earnings announcements, is less distracting to investors and enhances investors' attention to firms' fundamental values. As a consequence, initial market reactions to earnings announcements, as reflected in stock returns and trading volume, are stronger and PEAD is weaker (Hirshleifer et al. 2009 ). Analogously, simultaneously analyzing and comparing earnings news based on fewer domestic GAAPs is expected to create less distraction and thus enhance investors' attention to assess the values of U.S. and ADR firms. I use the number of domestic GAAPs reflected in the set of earnings announcements made on a given day to proxy for the level of distraction. I find evidence that fewer domestic GAAPs used by announcement firms on a given earnings announcement day increase earnings response coefficients (ERC) and the sensitivity of trading volume to earnings announcements. I also find that fewer domestic GAAPs decrease PEAD. In addition, the smaller differences of the measurement standards between a domestic GAAP or International Accounting Standards (IAS), on one hand, and U.S. GAAP, on 1 Limited attention is "the limited cognitive information processing capacity of selectively concentrating on one aspect of the environment while ignoring other things" (James 1980, p120) .
the other hand, decrease the distraction effects. The subsequent hedge portfolio return based on PEAD is less profitable when there are fewer domestic GAAPs.
The issues addressed in this study are important to capital market participants. Investors have increasingly sought investment opportunities overseas (Tweedie 2006; Covrig et al. 2007 ).
JP Morgan (Buy-side Survey: ADR Investing, 2003) reports that foreign companies listed on major U.S. stock exchanges raised $57. Furthermore, from a behavioral finance perspective, Daniel et al. (2003) suggest that standard setters and regulators should establish rules ex ante to improve choices and efficiency and to help investors avoid psychological errors, rather than to assume market efficiency ex ante.
Prior studies show that the differences among domestic GAAPs influence home bias 2 (Bradshaw et al. 2004; Covrig et al. 2007 ). How the presence of different domestic GAAPs influences investors' limited attention bias is an equivalently crucial yet unexplored issue. I attempt to fill this gap and contribute the literature by investigating the extent to which the number of domestic GAAPs used to compute earnings announced on the same day affects alter investors' limited attention bias and stock mispricing. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to empirically investigate the relation between different domestic GAAPs and investors' limited attention bias and how the relation impacts price efficiency.
The research questions I ask are also timely given the recent and continuing convergence toward International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) -a single set of accounting standards internationally. Proponents claim that convergence should reduce the cost and time involved in processing accounting information since investors will need to master fewer domestic GAAPs.
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As Sir David Tweedie, Chairman of International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), said that, "For companies operating in multiple countries …the acceptance of international standards will cut the cost of complying with various national regimes … A common financial language, applied consistently, will enable investors to compare the financial results of companies operating in different jurisdictions more easily and provide more opportunity for investment and diversification … An international approach for accounting should … enable audit firms and their clients to develop consistent global practices to accounting problems … thus further enhancing consistency. Finally, for regulators, the confusion associated with needing to understand various reporting regimes would be reduced" (Tweedie 2006, 2).
However, there are costs associated with this movement 4 . Whether convergence brings positive or negative economic consequences has generated much debate and remains unresolved for investors, standard setters, researchers, and regulators. My study sheds the light on this issue.
I organize the remainder of the paper as follows. In the next section I summarize the prior literature, state my research hypotheses and develop predictions regarding the effects of convergence on investors' limited attention bias. In Section III, I discuss the sample, data and research design. Section IV presents the empirical results. Section V discusses results of additional analyses, and I offer concluding remarks in Section VI.
3 Proponents also argue that the potential advantages of convergence include improvement in the quality of financial accounting information and reduction of information asymmetry between investors and firms and therefore decreased cost of capital. 4 Opponents argue that convergence ignores regional differences in institutional factors. Convergence of GAAPs can make publicly available financial accounting information "coarser" (Blackwell 1956 ) if the lost information now has to be deduced from other available resources. There are also implementation and transition costs of convergence for companies and investors that could exceed the benefits of convergence.
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT The presence of fewer multiple domestic GAAPs mitigates limited attention bias
The presence of fewer different domestic GAAPs can potentially mitigate investors' limited attention bias. A recent study by Armstrong et al. (2008) examines European stock market reactions to 16 events associated with the adoption of IFRS. The study finds that firms from lower pre-adoption information quality information environments generally have more positive market reactions and infers that such reactions are likely due to improved financial reporting quality and/or to convergence of various domestic GAAPs. They also find more positive reactions for firms having higher quality pre-adoption information environments, and interpret that finding as more likely the result of convergence per se. They do not distinguish improved financial reporting quality and convergence in their tests, but rather assert that if the prior information environment was already of high quality, then observed positive market reactions should be attributable to the benefits of convergence. Their study suggests that the presence of fewer different domestic GAAPs can impact equity capital market reactions.
From a behavioral perspective, human beings have limited information processing capacity and attention. Psychologists show that processing information from multiple sources or performing multiple tasks at the same time is difficult and can impair performance. With regard to financial markets, findings from experimental, theoretical, and empirical research suggest that it is difficult to process large amounts of information at the same time, and neglecting some relevant information can create systematic mispricing. Different accounting methods (e.g., the pooling versus purchase method) or different forms of presenting financial information (e.g., recognition on the income statement versus disclosure in the footnotes) can influence individuals' conscious thought and investment decision-making (e.g., Libby et al. 2002) . Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) Daniel et al. (2002, 187) conjecture that "Harmonization of accounting standards internationally is advantageous in reducing the cognitive burdens put on investors who wish to diversify internationally, and will tend to reduce the problem of inappropriate anchoring on non-U.S. accounting earnings." A decrease in the number of financial reporting rules used by different firms reduces investors' burdens to understand, analyze, and compare multiple GAAPs in addition to making investment decisions. Analogous to Hirshleifer et al. (2009) , the presence of fewer multiple domestic GAAPs should decrease the distraction from understanding and comparing different domestic GAAPs and is expected to enhance investors' attention and reactions to information relevant to firms' value, such as earnings news.
5 SEC Form 6-K is the report filed by foreign issuers pursuant to Rules 13a-16 and 15d-16 Amendments.
The presence of fewer multiple domestic GAAPs exacerbates limited attention bias
However, it is also possible that fewer numbers of domestic GAAPs can exacerbate U.S.
investors' limited attention bias and create more mispricing. A standard finding in the behavioral finance literature is that prices reflect a weighted average of the beliefs of rational and irrational traders, as adjusted by a risk premium (e.g., Lee 2001; Daniel et al., 2001) . Further, the market valuation of a firm reflects a weighted average of the beliefs of investors who fully or partially pay attention to the economic environment of the firm (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003) .
To become attentive (i.e., to avoid distraction), investors need to allocate their cognitive resources toward interpreting earnings announcements instead of being involved in other activities. The decrease of financial information processing time and cost brought about by the presence of fewer domestic GAAPs should lower the barriers for investors to become GAAP experts (i.e., regarding the fewer remaining GAAPs), which should lead to an increase in the number of GAAP experts. Barth et al. (1999) analytically show the effects of harmonization 6 of domestic GAAPs on price informativeness and trading volume depends on the interactions between direct informational effects (i.e., whether harmonization increases or decreases GAAP measurement errors) and expertise acquisition effects (i.e., net benefits to foreign investors of becoming domestic GAAP experts). Harmonization to a higher quality GAAP can adversely affect price informativeness and trading volume if negative expertise acquisition effects outstrip positive direct informational effects. As suggested in Barth et al. (1999) , if the domestic GAAPs in use prior to harmonization are of higher quality, the need for interpretation and analysis from GAAP experts and thus the informational benefits of expertise decrease. Since the costs of becoming a GAAP expert decrease but the benefits of such expertise also decrease, the net benefits from expertise acquisition can decrease. 
Measuring the Presence of Fewer Domestic GAAPs
To isolate the extent of the presence of fewer domestic GAAPs, I count the number of different domestic GAAPs (NGAAP) used by all firms announcing their quarterly earnings on a given day. Greater (fewer) NGAAP is the proxy for the higher ( 13 quarter q as SUE jq = (AE jq -FE jq ) / P jq, where P jq is the price per share for firm j at the end of the quarter that precedes the announcements. for a firm as the normalized difference between log dollar volume on day t and the average log dollar volume over days [-41, -11] relative to the earnings announcement date for the firm. Daily 8 The results of using analysts' forecast as the market expectation do not change the inferences. 9 The data library is available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. The size breakpoints for year y are the NYSE market equity quintiles at the end of June of y. BM for June of year y is the book equity for the last fiscal year end in y-1 divided by market value for December of y-1. Similarly, the BM breakpoints are NYSE quintiles. dollar trading volume is the product of the daily closing price and the daily number of shares traded 10 from CRSP database:
The announcement period abnormal trading volume is defined as the average abnormal trading volume for the three day period [-1, 1] (Hirshleifer et al. 2009 ).
In addition, I examine the post-announcement period (i.e., PEAD) stock returns associated with the number of domestic GAAPs on a given earnings announcement day. Prior literature (i.e., Bernard and Thomas 1990) shows that most of the drift occurs during the first 60 trading days after an earnings announcement. Hence, I choose 60 trading days for the postannouncement window. The post-announcement period return is defined as the size-and BMadjusted CAR for the 60-day period [2, 61] , where day 2 is two trading days after the earnings announcement day (Hirshleifer et al. 2009 ). The computation method of CAR [2, 61] is the same as for CAR [-1, 1] .
Control Variables
I include control variables to address alternative factors that also affect initial market reactions and PEAD. Hirshleifer et al. (2009) show that more earnings announcements made on a given day exacerbate investors' limited attention bias. I control for the number of earnings announcements and note that it is positively correlated with the number of domestic GAAPs on an announcement day. I also control for risk and growth opportunities because prior research shows they are cross-sectional determinants of initial market responses (H1 and H2) to earnings surprises (Collins and Kothari 1989, Hirshleifer et al. 2009 ). In addition, I control for firm size, analyst following, and investor sophistication (proxied by institutional ownership) because prior research shows that those factors affect subsequent market responses to earnings surprises (H3) (Bernard and Thomas 1990; Bartov et al. 2000) . For the abnormal trading volume analysis, I
additionally control for market-wide variation in trading volume.
I compute the number of earnings announcements on an announcement day, log of firm size, BM ratio, log of one plus the number of analysts following a firm during the most recent fiscal year, and market abnormal trading volume in the announcement period. I compute institutional ownership as the percentage of a firm's shares owned by institutions at the end of the most recent calendar quarter before the earnings announcement. The institutional ownership and analyst following data are from Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum 13F database and IBES database, respectively. I also include a U.S. /ADR firm dummy to address the possibility that the findings can be driven by the systematic differences between U.S. and ADR firms. Appendix 2 provides a summary of variable definitions and data sources.
Empirical Models
To address potential problems of outliers and non-linearity between earnings and returns, I
use the quarterly decile rank of SUE (RSUE) in the multivariate analysis. I winsorize the number of domestic GAAPs to ten since 90% of earnings announcement days have ten or fewer domestic GAAPs. I also rank all control variables (Controls) into ten groups each quarter to standardize them. 11 To examine how the simultaneous presence of fewer domestic GAAPs affects on investors' limited attention bias, the multivariate tests focus on the incremental effect of NGAAP on initial market reactions (returns and trading volume) and PEAD.
11 All the inferences are similar by using raw numbers of controls. Gow et al. 2008) .
12 I also include year-, month-, and day-of-the-week dummies to address the possibility of time effects. 12 To calculate two-way cluster-robust standard errors, I group into i clusters by firms of N i observations, for i in {1,…,I}, and t clusters by quarters of N t observations, for t in {1,…,T}. The covariance matrix is estimated using the following expression,
13

IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Sample Selection and Distribution
is the N i ×K matrix of regressors, and u i is the N i -vector of residuals for cluster i. X t is the N t ×K matrix of regressors, and u t is the N t -vector of residuals for cluster t. The interaction matrix is the usual heteroskedasticityrobust OLS variance matrix (White, 1980) . 13 I also perform the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure to estimate the cross-sectional regressions for each quarter as the sensitivity analysis. The results are robust and the inferences do not change.
eliminate "penny stocks" and very small firms. The final sample is 173,211 firm-quarterly earnings announcements (163,814 U.S. and 9,397 ADR).
Panels B and C of Table 1 show U.S and ADR firms' quarterly earnings announcements.
There are 9,664 U.S. firms and 760 ADR firms represented across the 13 years and 52 quarters.
Among ADR firm earnings announcements, Canadian firms have the largest number of earnings announcements (51%). Panel D shows the distribution of ADR firms' quarterly earnings prepared by different domestic GAAPs and IFRS. In the sample, 52% of ADR firms' quarterly earnings are prepared using Canadian GAAP, followed by IFRS (6.1%), U.S. GAAP (5.5%), and U.K. GAAP (5.3%).
[Insert 15 The patterns of non-U.S. firm earnings announcements examined by the day of week (clustering on Tuesday, Wednesdays, and Thursday) and month (low in March, June, September, and December) are similar to those of the U.S. sample (unreported). 16 The sensitivity is 0.01084 + (-0.00019*10) = 0.00894 for NGAAP=10, and is 0.01084 + (-0.00019*1) = 0.01065 for NGAAP=1.
points for the three day announcement window and by an additional 6% on annual basis. 17 The results support H1 and indicate that investor reaction to earnings news as measured by cumulative abnormal returns is weaker when there are more different domestic GAAPs on an earnings announcement day.
[Insert Table 4 ] [Insert Table 5 ]
With regard to testing H3, since PEAD is most pronounced in the extreme SUE, I select the observations in the lowest and highest decile of RSUE for regression (3). 18 The sample size falls 17 The additional basis points are calculated by multiplying the coefficients on the interaction terms (-0.00019) by the standard deviation of NGAAP (2.55) from Table 2 , Panel A. 18 To be consistent, I also run regressions (1) and (2) using the observations in the lowest and highest decile RSUE and the results for H1 and H2 are not affected.
to 33,050 firm-quarter observations. GAAPs conditional on the number of earnings announcements. I compute entropy as the follows and multiply it by -1 in my analyses:
where g is NGAAP, n i is the number of earnings announcements measured using by different domestic GAAPs, and N is Nea. Low (high) Entropy is proxied for less (more) distraction to investors. The mean Entropy is 0.247 and the median is 0.22 ( I replace NGAAP with Rentropy (NDiff) to re-estimate regression (1), (2) and (3). The results are in Table 4 , 5, and 6 as Model 2 and Model 3 for Rentropy and NDiff, respectively. They show that high Rentropy (NDiff) weakens initial market reactions and strengthens subsequent PEAD.
The findings further support my hypotheses that presence of fewer domestic GAAPs demands less investor information processing capacity to understand and compare foreign and doesmtic earnings numbers, reflecting an increased initial market reaction to firms' earnings announcements and a decreased subsequent PEAD.
Hedge Portfolio Based on SUE and NGAAP
The findings for H3 suggest that the number of domestic GAAPs on earnings announcement portfolio (Rsue =10) and short in the bad news portfolio (Rsue=1), and compute the return of the hedge portfolio. I measure abnormal returns as the four-factor alpha, the intercept of a regression of portfolio monthly excess returns on the MKT, SMB, HML and Momentum factors French 1993, Carhart 1997) .
Since the presence of more domestic GAAP on an earnings announcement day strengthens the subsequent PEAD, the hedge portfolio return is expected to be significantly more profitable for the highest NGAAP than for the lowest NGAAP. Table 7 , Panels A and B show, respectively, equal weighted portfolio returns and portfolio four-factor alphas. As predicted, the equal weighted hedge portfolio return for NGAAP =4 is 0.047% and it is 0.027% for NGAAP =1, and the difference is marginally significant at the 10% level. The hedge portfolio four-factor alpha for NGAAP =4 is 0.045% and 0.021% for NGAAP=1 and the difference is significant at the 5% level. Absent transaction costs, the findings of Table 7 suggest that the portfolio returns are higher when NGAAP is high. Most importantly, the results imply that the presence of fewer domestic GAAPs improves price efficiency since the hedge portfolio based on PEAD is less profitable on low NGAAP days.
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[Insert Table 7] V.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS Accounting Quality
Accounting quality can also affect how the market responds to earnings announcments. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) show that an increase in overall earnings opacity 24 in a country is linked to a significant increase in the cost of equity and a significant decrease in trading in the 23 Since deciles are formed quarterly, the hedge portfolio may not be implementable because of the potential lookahead bias. 24 The measure is computed as the average rank of three dimensions in each country-year: earnings aggressiveness (the median of accruals divided by lagged total assets), loss avoidance (the ratio of the number of firms with small positive earnings minus the number of firms with small negative earnings divided by their sum), and earnings smoothing (the cross-sectional correlation between the change in accruals and the change in cash flows, both scaled by lagged total assets).
stock market of that country. Pincus et al. (2007) show that the accrual anomaly is more likely to occur in countries allowing extensive use of accrual accounting, and that earnings management can explain the anomaly.
It is possible that NGAAP proxies for the quality of different domestic accounting standards.
To address this concern, I use and compute the country-level earnings management score (EM) developed by Leuz et al. (2003) to measure the quality of different domestic GAAPs and include EM in the analysis. EM is the average rank across four measures: (1) volatility of earnings relative to volatility of cash flows (EM1), (2) the correlation between cash flows and accruals (EM2), (3) extent of discretion in accruals based on the absolute magnitude of accruals relative to the absolute value of cash flows (EM3), and (4) 
Currency -Euro
Second, investors may be distracted by different currency translations into U.S. dollars.
Hence, my findings can potentially capture the distraction effects of "currency" rather than "GAAP" translations. I address this concern as follows. I focus on U.S. 
Exclusion of OTC Firms
Third, OTC firms have lower financial reporting requirements than NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX firms. Therefore, my findings may be driven by the poorer information environments of OTC firms. I exclude OTC firms and re-estimate all regressions to address this concern. Tables 8 and 9 show that the results for CAR (-1, 1) and CAR (2, 61) controlling for alternative explanations. The direction and significance of the coefficients of RSUE*NGAAP for CAR (-1, 1) and CAR (2, 61) do not change after controlling the accounting quality and distraction from currency translation and excluding of OTC firms.
Multivariate Analysis of Alternative Explanations
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The results indicate that NGAAP is unlikely to proxy for accounting quality of different domestic GAAPs or for the convergence of currencies. The findings also are not driven by the subsamples of firm. 27 In addition, the findings from Panels A of Tables 8 and 9 suggest that 26 Unreported results show that the direction and significance of the coefficients of RabsSUE*NGAAP also do not change for Ab_Vol (-1, 1 
Appendix 1. Classification of Accounting Standards
To obtain the accurate firm-quarter domestic GAAP information, I first use the quarterly "Accounting Standards" field in Global Vantage. Next, I use Web crawling program and PERL to gather SEC Form-20F or Form 20-F/A filings from the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR) and analyze the relevant parts (e.g., key financial information, accounting principles' footnote, or auditors' report) to obtain missing domestic GAAP information for remaining Non-U.S. firms and to verify with Global Vantage coding. 28 Supplementary to using EDGAR, I also search companies' financial statements from Thomson Research or companies' Web sites since the SEC did not mandate electronic filings of foreign firms until November 4, 2002. This appendix describes those processes in more detail. 
I code firm-quarter observation as domestic GAAP if one of the following cases applies:
1) Preliminary Note indicates that financial information is prepared in accordance with domestic GAAP.
2) Item 3. of Form 20-F Key Information indicates that financial information is prepared in accordance with domestic GAAP.
3) Item 8. Financial Information indicates that financial information is prepared in accordance with domestic GAAP. CAR(-1,1): Size-and BM-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns over the earnings announcement window (t-1, t+1) relative to the t=0 earnings announcement day (Data source: Compustat-CRSP merged database for earnings announcement dates and CRSP database for raw returns) CAR CAR(2,61): Size-and BM-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns over the post-announcement drift period (t+2, t+61) relative to the t=0 earnings announcement day Ab_Vol (-1,1)
The normalized difference between average log dollar volume over the earnings announcement window (t-1, t+1) and the average log dollar volume over days [-41, -11] relative to the earnings announcement date t for the firm. Daily dollar trading volume is the product of the daily closing price and the daily number of shares traded: , g is the number of domestic GAAPs used by announcement firms, n i is the number of earnings announcements measured using by different domestic GAAPs, and N is the total number of earnings announcements on an given day.
EM
The average rank across four measures, EM1-EM4: EM1 is a country's median ratio of the firm-level standard deviations of income before extraordinary items and operating cash flow (both scaled by lagged total assets). Standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed). *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed). Standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed). See Appendix 2 for the definitions of variables *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed). Standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed). Standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed).
